Otte: b, Proof and perception II. Preuve Proof Prueba. Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things. Burks, , quotations according to volume and paragraph. Selected Philosophical Writings , Vol. I — , Vol. II — ed.
Indiana University Press, Bloomingtion and Indianapolis. Peirce: L, Letter numbered according to Richard S. Available in the Peirce Microfilm edition. Mouton, Berlin. Peirce: Microfilms, The Charles S. Peirce Papers. Peirce , Vol. I—IV ed. The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby ed.
Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London. Peirce, Semiotische Schriften , Vol.
I—III German ed. Kloesel and H. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. Peirce: ff. A Chronological Edition , Vol. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Peirce: , Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis. Peirce: , Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic. Peirce: , Logical Machines. Modern Logic 7 : ; repr. Peirce: , The Law of Mind.
Peirce: , ca. Peirce: , Multitude and Number. See MSS , , and pp. Peirce: , The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of CCL; lect. MS ; CP 7. MS ; LOS: — L , ISP 72— Peirce: a, The Carnegie Application. MS ; CP 2. MS ; CP 4. Peirce: —3, Minute Logic IV [a digression]. Peirce: a, Lectures on Pragmatism [held from March, Peirce: b, Logical Tracts. MS Peirce: —04, Lowell Lectures on Logic. MSS — In part in CP 2.
In a rejoinder to Schneider, Carl R. Hausman expresses a similar but more ambiguous position.
Peirce did not equate value with esthetical goodness alone; but with a complex triadic structure that elicits not only the idea of beauty, but also the notions of right and truth. As I understand, Peirce argued for a threefold notion of the normative ideal, in which logic, ethics, and esthetics are equally identified with the category of Thirdness.
Murphey confirms this interpretation:. That which seems to constitute the acme of beauty for Peirce is the Firstness of genuine Thirdness carried to the furthest extreme — that is to say, it is the quality arising from order, and the more developed the order the greater the beauty […]. Now that order will be the result of laws or habits — Thirds which control the arrangement of the aggregate of Seconds. Murphey, It is a pure Feeling but a feeling that is the Impress of a Reasonableness that Creates.
It is the Firstness that truly belongs to a Thirdness in its achievement of Secondness. MS Briefly, the categories of Secondness and Thirdness can assume degenerate forms, in which their characters appear weak and disfigured CP 5. In order to understand these degenerate forms, the prescindibility of the categories is a key idea.
It happens when one can hypothetically consider one category while deliberately neglecting the existence of another.
It means that one element can be detached, or abstracted from the other. But separation by prescission is not a reciprocal process, Peirce observed EP1: 3, That is, one can deliberately suppose uncolored space, but not color without space. Each category can only be prescinded, or supposedly detached from, the category that comes next. It is not accidental that Peirce decided to name his categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness — which are ordinal, not cardinal, numbers, indicating a hierarchy.
This means that the conception of the category of Secondness is that of an actual fact which requires the existence of two different objects: a first and a second — it involves a dyadic relation. The same applies to the conception of the category of Thirdness, for it involves the presence of three different elements: a first and a second that act in response to one another in virtue of a third — it involves a triadic relation.
Hence, the degeneracy of the categories of Secondness and Thirdness, as opposed to the category of Firstness, derives specifically from the logical complexity implicated in dyadic and triadic relations. Consider the following:. Where you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness.
Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. So, in order to picture the degenerate forms of each category, one should focus on the bold letters and the bold borders. However, as Peirce explains, the subsequent divisions will not entirely follow a trichotomy; they will divide in different ways. For instance, Reactional Thirdness will follow the manner of the divisions of the category of Secondness — it will divide in two; and Qualitative Thirdness will not divide at all.
To illustrate these three divisions of Thirdness and its subsequent subdivisions, Peirce devised the following diagram EP 2, , :. The second conclusion is that the only subdivisions that can be carried on ad infinitum are those of genuine Thirdness. These infinite subdivisions of the Third disclose an endless series of representational experiences that indicate the idea of continuity and illustrate Thirdness to perfection CP 1.
The most degenerate Thirdness is where we conceive a mere Quality of Feeling, or Firstness, to represent itself to itself as Representation. Such, for example, would be Pure Self-Consciousness, which might be roughly described as a mere feeling that has a dark instinct of being a germ of thought.
In the line of the divisions of the Genuine Third one can relate it to the idea of true continuity logic , and thus understand its evolutionary character CP 5. This process is described as the growth of concrete reasonableness. This dimension of the normative ideal cannot be contracted in any individual; but more than that, it leads toward a reality unaffected by human perversity. Similarly, in the line of the divisions of the Reactional Third one can relate the normative ideal to the element of duality ethics , for the growth of concrete reasonableness takes place in cognition through the exercise of self-control, or conscious inhibition; and it will usually fall into a catena, which discloses two opposing ways of thinking: right and wrong.
And by picturing the conception of the normative ideal in the unitary line of the Qualitative Third one will sense an attractive instigation of thought esthetics. Thus, when Peirce affirmed that the central problem of the normative sciences comes down to a question of esthetics, he did not commit himself to some kind of hedonism, emotivism, or subjectivism, since he did not reduce the summum bonum to a mere feeling — otherwise, the normative interpretant would lack objectivity and Peirce would subscribe to some kind of ethical nominalism. Peirce changed his mind many times in his life, and in relation to many philosophical topics.
It is not surprising that he also changed his mind about the notion of normativity and its place in his philosophy. While a diachronic approach was necessary to argue against the efforts to resolve the inconsistencies in his writings, a sub-categorical account was essential to support the view that Peirce moved from a nominalist to a realist position — not only in Metaphysics, but in Moral Philosophy too.
Volume 8 of this landmark edition follows Peirce from May through July —a period of turmoil as his career unraveled at the U.S. Volume 8 of this landmark edition follows Peirce from May through July a period of turmoil as his career unraveled at the U.S. Coast and Geodetic.
Rosenthal, C. Hausman, and D. Anderson eds. Bernstein R. Bernstein ed.
Boler J. Skowronski eds. Debrock G. DeMarco J. Esposito J.
Ketner, J. Ransdell, C. Eisele, M. Hardwick eds. Fisch M. Hardwick eds , Proceedings of the C.